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Abstract:
This paper investigates the effects of different degrees of wage setting centralisation on (1)
the incentive of a MNE to locate in a host country, (2) the optimal level of investment it
decides to commit to its foreign operation, and (3) the host country’s welfare.
Decentralised and centralised wage bargaining are considered. The nature of product
market competition between the MNE and domestic firms affects results which cast doubt
on some of the conventional wisdom on FDI. In particular, we show that: (i) it is not
always welfare improving to attract inward FDI, and (ii) the MNE may prefer centralised to
decentralised wage setting regimes.
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21. Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed a substantial growth of foreign direct
investment (FDI). As a result, increasing attention has been devoted in policy debates to the
welfare consequences of FDI for the host country and to the factors affecting
multinationals’ choice of location. A consensus seems to have emerged around some
commonly accepted views which form a “conventional wisdom” on FDI. Three of these
conventional views are: (1) Inward FDI is welfare improving for a host country, regardless
of the type of labour market institutions; (2) Multinational enterprises (MNEs) prefer
decentralised firm level wage bargaining processes to centralised ones; (3) Governments
should subsidise inward FDI, in particular in the presence of unionised labour markets.
The first of these conventional wisdoms concerns the welfare effects of FDI for the
host country. Although different interest groups within an economy may hold conflicting
views as to the desirability of inward FDI, it is probably appropriate to state that on balance
governments see it as welfare improving1. Thus, increasingly, “international
competitiveness” is not only meant to reflect the ability of a country to compete on
international goods markets, but also its attractiveness to foreign MNEs.
The second conventional wisdom relates to the determinants of multinationals’
choice of location, amongst which labour market characteristics and institutions are
considered major factors. According to the emerging consensus, MNEs prefer flexible non-
unionised labour markets and, when unionisation is in place,  decentralised firm level wage
bargaining processes over centralised ones. Despite ample empirical evidence (UN
Investment Report, 1997) suggesting that labour costs are just one of the many
considerations behind MNEs’ location decisions, this view rests on the assumption that
they are crucial in determining countries’ ability to compete for FDI: by increasing labour
costs, unionisation is detrimental to a country’s attractiveness to MNEs. This type of
argument has often been used in relatively highly unionised industrialised countries to
endorse legislation aimed at limiting unions’ power and deregulating the bargaining
                                               
1
 Typical benefits associated with inward FDI are increased employment, technological externalities,
emergence of new and/or more dynamic sectors, procompetitive effects on industry structure. Amongst its
costs is the excessive competitive pressure on home firms which may force them out of business rather than
stimulate their efficiency. Furthermore, as Zhao (1995) and Lahiri and Ono (1997) point out, the possible
emergence of cross-hauling in FDI, may induce an “export of jobs” thus outweighing the creation of new
jobs by the inward FDI.
3process.
The third conventional wisdom is almost a corollary of the other two. The
desirability of inward FDI suggests the need for subsidising it, in particular when unionised
labour markets are likely to make a host country less attractive to foreign MNEs. It is in
fact common practice for national governments to subsidise and to compete for inward
FDI2.
This paper attempts to evaluate the conventional wisdom outlined above in the
context of unionised labour markets.
The interaction between labour market unionisation and FDI has received
surprisingly little attention in the theoretical literature where the two have mostly been
studied separately.  Imperfect competition and positive profits create incentives for
strategic trade policy to attract and extract rents from MNEs, as for instance in Brander
and Spencer (1987), Bond and Samuelson (1989) and Janeba (1996).  The effects of trade
on labour markets have been typically studied within the theory of distortions (e.g.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983) or the political economy framework (Dinoupoulos, 1983).
More recently, Brecher and Van Long (1989) analyse the impact of protection on
employment and welfare in an open economy with a central union. Brander and Spencer
(1988) and Santoni (1996) analyse the effect of unionisation and trade policies in a Nash-
Cournot duopoly where a unionised home firm competes  against a foreign firm.  Huzinga
(1993) and Naylor (1998) examine the effects of market integration within a unionised
sector.  Very little work has been done on the relationship between labour market
unionisation and FDI. Notable exception is Zhao (1995, 1998) where cross-hauling FDI is
generated between two countries with imperfectly competitive product markets and
unionised labour markets. Naylor and Santoni (1998) analyse the effects of union power
and degree of substitutability between products on FDI.
Within the unionisation-FDI literature, our paper is the first of which we are aware
to: (1) examine the effects of different degrees of union centralisation on FDI and welfare,
(2) study  the role of different modes of product market interaction between MNEs and
domestic firms, (3) analyse the optimal policy towards FDI when unions extract rents from
                                                                                                                                             
2
 Bond and Guisinger (1985) study the effects of regional incentive programmes on the location decisions
of MNEs. Haaparanta (1996) analyses the effects of  tax competition between two countries on the
allocation of an exogenously given amount of  FDI by a MNE between them.
4MNEs, and (4) analyse the strategic use of capital investment by the MNE to affect the
wage it faces3. The focus of our analysis may be especially relevant to Europe where labour
markets are generally highly unionised but where the degree of centralisation varies greatly
across countries (Freeman and Katz, 1995) and where countries are characterised by
different patterns of inwards FDI (Barrel and Pain, 1997).
We consider two alternative wage setting regimes. The first is decentralised, with
trade unions bargaining  individually with each firm.  The second is a centralised regime in
which one single wage is set for an industry or group of industries. In the latter case, the
wage setting process represents a link between the MNE and the domestic firms, even
when direct product market competition between them is absent.
Our analysis shows that the results crucially depend on the nature of product market
interaction between the MNE and host country’s firms. We consider two situations. In the
first there is no product market interaction, and the MNE will not compete with home firms
either in the domestic or in any other market. This allows us to isolate the effects of  wage
determination  on the host country’s welfare and on the MNE’s decisions. We subsequently
allow for product market interaction, which could occur in either the domestic or in an
export market. This is not an academic distinction but one which may be seen as reflecting
the motives behind a MNE’s decision to locate in a host country. When the latter is seen by
the MNE as an export base, the absence of direct competition with domestic firms is a
plausible assumption. This is more likely the smaller is the economic size of the host
country relative to the MNE’s export market. A typical example of this is Ireland: its high
share of inward FDI, which could not be ascribed to the extent of its domestic market, has
mainly occurred in sectors which did not have a significant presence of indigenous firms. If,
however, the MNE is attracted by domestic sales, it is likely (particularly in relatively large
industrialised countries) that it will face competition from the host country’s firms.
The model is developed in Section 2. Section 3 and 4 look at the alternative product
market interaction cases, carry out welfare comparisons across different regimes and
discuss the implications for policy towards FDI. Section 5 endogenises the level of capital
investment of the MNE and analyses the government’s optimal policy. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
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 Bughin and Vannini (1995) were probably the first to highlight the rent -extracting role of unions with
FDI. Their model, however, does not address any of these points.
52. The Model Set-up
Consider a model with a multinational which may set up in a host country where N
symmetric domestic firms are already located. All firms (including the MNE) are unionised.
We model the interaction between agents as a three-stage game. In stage one, the
MNE decides whether to locate in the host country. In stage two, unions choose the wage
at which labour will be supplied to firms4. We consider two alternative wage setting
regimes. The  first is decentralised with the unions bargaining individually with each firm. In
the second, the wage bargaining is concluded centrally and one wage is set for all firms in
the country. In stage three, firms choose their output levels. Two types of product market
competition are analysed: (1) the home firms and the MNE do not compete in the product
market and the MNE exports all of its output; (2) domestic firms and the MNE all compete
in the same market which may or may not be the home market itself.
In the absence of direct product market interaction between the MNE and domestic
firms, the latter may sell in the home market or be exporters. For simplicity, in this case we
shall also rule out competition between domestic firms. Thus, with decentralised wage
setting there is no link between the home firms and the MNE. However, when bargaining is
centralised, the wage setting process represents such a link. With direct product market
competition, the MNE and the domestic firms are linked via the product market even with
decentralised bargaining.
The MNE has a revenue function R y D yp y D* * * *( , ) ( , )=   where y
 
and *p  are the
MNE’s output and price and *D  is the output  of its competitors5. The revenue function
for a typical home firm will be R q Di i
i( , )  = )D,q(pq iiii  where iq  and ip  are its output
and  price, and  iD  is the output of all its competitors (this may include the multinational).
If the MNE locates it will hire labour at a wage *w , set in stage two by the unions.
For a firm to prosper in a foreign environment, it will generally possess some firm
specific advantages (Dunning, 1988). We assume this firm-specific advantage to consist of
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 The focus of our analysis is on comparing different wage setting regimes. To isolate their effect it is
convenient to hold constant the relative bargaining po wer of the union. In th is context, it is simplest to
assume that unions are monopoly wage setters.
5
 This revenue function is general enough to encompass product differentiation . However, we shall only
consider either homogenous goods, or maximum product differentiation, so that firms are in completely
separate industries.
6a higher labour productivity, resulting from  technical superiority and/or higher capital
intensity6. The MNE’s unit labour input requirement is negatively related to its capital
investment (K) which we initially take to be exogenous. The profit function of the
multinational is then:
F)K,y(Lw)D,y(R ***** −−=π (1)
where *L  is the labour employed in its host country’s operation and F is a  fixed cost
which may include the cost of capital.
The typical home firm’s profit function is:
iii
iii Lw)D,q(R −=π  (2)
where i
i qL =   is labour employed.
The firm-specific unions’ utility functions for the the multinational and the typical
home firm are respectively:
*** L)ww(U −= (3)
and
i
i
i L)ww(U −= (4)
where w  is  the constant wage paid to non-unionised workers7.
The national welfare function is given by:
∑ +++= n
i
i
i
* )U(UCSW π (5)
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 Evidence  suggests that MNEs typically have a higher productivity than domestic firms (e.g.  Davies and
Lyons, 1992).
7
 We assume that employment and wages have the same weights in the unions’ utility functions. One could
easily allow for different weights, but this would not yield many additional insights in this context.
7where consumer surplus (CS) is zero when firms only export and is positive when firms sell
to home consumers.
The stage-three first-order conditions for the choice of output of the multinational
and the typical home firm are respectively given by
0LwR *y**y =− (6)
and
R wq
i
i
− = 0 (7)
where by assumption *yL ≤ iqiL =1.
In stage two the unions choose wages to maximise total labour rents.  We assume a
right-to-manage model where firms retain discretion over employment decisions.
First assume that wages are set on a decentralised basis by unions which are
monopolists at the firm level. In this case the particular wage in the multinational sector will
be m* ww = . The first-order condition for the union in the multinational is:
0L
w
L)ww(
w
U *
m
*
m
m
*
=+
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
(8)
and that for a typical domestic firm’s union is :
0L
w
L)ww(
w
U i
i
i
i
i
i
=+
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂ (9)
Instead, with centralised bargaining, a single wage is set to maximise the sum of the
individual unions’ utilities: V=U*+NU. This implies the following first order condition:
80
w
)ww(
dw
dV
c
c
c
=+
∂
∂
−= ΛΛ (10)
where *c www ==  is the centralised wage and *i LNL +≡Λ .
In stage one of the game, the MNE will locate if its profit *π  is greater than a
reservation profit π  which is assumed to be exogenous and  to reflect the profit
opportunities of locating elsewhere. The exogeneity of π  implies that the host country is
small in the market for FDI.
3.  No Product Market Interaction
In the absence of product market interaction between the multinational and
domestic firms, the MNE is assumed to export all its output.
3.1. Decentralised wage setting
With decentralised bargaining, the equilibrium values of wages are  implicitly given
by (8) and (9).
To obtain some clearer results we will often adopt specific functional forms. In
particular we shall impose the following assumptions:  (A.1)  Linear demands:
i
i
i
*
* q
s
1
ap,y
s
1
ap −=−=   (11)
where is  represents a typical home firm’s  market size, and 
*s  is similarly defined for the
multinational. Symmetry among domestic firms implies that s= is  ∀  i (but s may differ
from *s ). (A.2) The MNEs’ labour input requirement  is α(K)= *L /y, with ′α ( )K <0.
Given A.1 and A.2  in (8) and  (9) we obtain:
w w
am
= +
 
1
2 α
(12)
9and
( )w w a= +1
2
(13)
where w is the symmetric domestic firms’ wage.  Given that α ≤ 1, it is obvious that mw ≥
w: the higher relative labour productivity of the multinational enables its union to extract a
higher wage than that extracted from domestic firms8.
3.2. Centralised wage setting
In the centralised bargaining case,  the equilibrium wage is implicitly given by (10).
With specific functional forms A.1 and A.2, the centralised wage is
w w
ac
= +
+
+




1
2 2
( )α
α
Γ
Γ
 (14)
where Γ≡ Ns/ *s  is an inverse measure of the MNE’s market size relative to the total of the
market sizes of domestic firms and  reflects the relative labour market importance of the
multinational sector from the point of view of the unions. Equation (14) implies 0
d
dwc
<
Γ
that is, the greater the relative market share of the MNE the higher is the centralised wage.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that cw  lies strictly between the two decentralised  wages
( mw and iw ), as illustrated in Figure 1 below. Thus, the centralised wage is always lower
than the decentralised wage paid by the multinational, because even in the absence of
product market interaction, centralisation generates a labour market link between the MNE
and the domestic firms. Taking this link into account, the unions choose to limit rent
extraction from the MNE, in order to maintain employment in the less efficient domestic
sector. This also explains the seemingly paradoxical impact of a higher capital investment of
the MNE on the centralised wage. Although it raises the potential for rent extraction from
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 This is consistent with the evidence that  MNEs typically pay higher wages than their domestic
10
the MNE, a higher K does not always result in a higher centralised wage. It can be shown
that if α is sufficiently high dw
dK
c
<09.
Figure 1: The centralised wage without product market interaction
3.3. Welfare and profits: the linear case
It is commonly argued that FDI is welfare improving for the receiving country. To assess
this view we shall evaluate the “welfare value” of the MNE to the host country, defined as
the ceteris paribus difference between the levels of welfare achieved with and without the
MNE.
The conventional wisdom holds without market interaction, when the “welfare
value” of FDI is positive regardless of the type of wage setting. It is easy to show that
0WW aj >−  for  j=d,c where the superscript j refers to the wage setting regime and the
subscript a refers to the absence of the MNE10.  The welfare value, however, is lower under
centralised than under decentralised wage setting, because rent extraction from the MNE is
lower with wage centralisation and there are negative spill-over effects of the higher
centralised wage on domestic firms’ profitability. It follows that the actual welfare level is
higher under decentralised than under centralised wage setting (i.e. cd WW > ).
                                                                                                                                             
counterparts (e.g. Driffield, 1996).
9
 Unions face a trade-off between wage and employment. A high wc will damage employment not only in
the MNE but also in the domestic sector. To protect employment, the unions may choose to reduce the
wage. This would not occur in the decentralised case where the domestic sector is not a concern for the
MNE’s union.
c
w
Γ
w
i
   w
m
w
c(Γ)
11
The commonly held view that MNEs prefer firm-level wage setting processes to
centralised ones is not supported by our analysis in the absence of direct product market
competition with domestic firms, given that cm ww >  implies higher MNE’s profits under
centralised wage setting.  Hence, a divergence of interests emerges between the MNE and
the host country’s government, with centralised wage setting making entry more attractive
to the MNE but leading to lower welfare levels.
The policy implication of this analysis is that when the MNE and the domestic firms
do not directly compete with each other in the product market, it is desirable for a host
country’s government to attract inward FDI. In this case, the government will be willing to
pay a lump-sum location subsidy up to the “welfare value” of the MNE.  Clearly, the
subsidy, which would be higher under decentralised wage setting, would only be required if
ππ ≤* .
4. Product Market Interaction
We will now allow for product market competition between the multinational and
the domestic firms. Assuming that  firms produce an identical commodity, the industry’s
inverse demand function is given by p=p(Q+y) where Q qi
i
N
= ∑ . Hence, in the MNE’s
revenue function QD* = , and in the revenue function of the typical home firm
∑
≠
+=
N
ij
j
i qyD .
4.1. Decentralised wage setting
In the decentralised bargaining case, unions play Nash so when a typical home
union i chooses its wage iw it takes as given mw  and the wages set by all other domestic
unions ( iw− ). Symmetry implies that all domestic firms will face the same equilibrium wage
(i.e. wwi = , ∀i). Thus, using  (8) and (9), we obtain the reaction functions:
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 Given the absence of market interaction, Wa  is identical under the two wage regimes.
12
)K,w(w
)K,w(w
m
*m
µ
µ
=
=
(15)
which define an equilibrium in wages. The analysis of the product market interaction case is
unwieldy for general functional forms. In order to develop the intuition we focus on  the
linear demand function P=a-b(Q+y) (assumption A.3). A.2 and A.3 imply positively sloped
wage reaction functions.
It is straightforward to show in the linear case that, although  
dK
dwm
>0, the MNE’s
marginal cost mm w)K(c α= falls in K.
Figure 2 plots the locus of the multinational’s marginal cost as a function of the
marginal cost of domestic firms (MM) and the locus of the home firms’ marginal cost as a
function of the MNE’s (HH).
Figure 2:  Effect of an increase in K on the marginal costs of the MNE and of a typical home
country’s firm.
An exogenous increase in K shifts the MM curve to the left and this results in a fall in both
*
c  and c ( *c  falls despite the fact that when K rises the union can extract higher wages).
This improves the MNE’s cost competitiveness relative to that of domestic firms and forces
c
c
*
** w)K(c α=
c =w
MM1MM2
HH
E1E2
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domestic firms’ unions to accept a lower wage11.
4.2. Centralised wage setting
Under centralised bargaining  the equilibrium wage is obtained from (10). Given
A.2 and A.3, it will be
  w w
a N
N N
c
= +
+
+ + −




1
2 1 2 12
( )
( ) ( )
α
α α
(16)
Contrary to the non market interaction case where cw  always lies below mw , when the
MNE competes with domestic firms in the product market we have mc ww >  for
sufficiently large N and α.  This is due to cooperative behaviour by the centralised unions
which, by internalising product market externalities, set a higher wage12.   
4.3. Welfare and profits: the linear case
With market interaction, when looking at the effects of inward FDI on the host country’s
welfare, it is important to distinguish between the cases in which firms do and do not sell in
the domestic market.
4.3.1. No domestic sales When firms are exporting only, the “welfare value” of
inward FDI is negative under both decentralised and centralised wage settings, at least for
N>1 (i.e.,  0WW jaj <−  for  j=d,c).  This is because the introduction of a new (foreign)
firm into the export sector of the economy has a negative effect on the terms of trade13. At
low N and high α the welfare costs of a MNE entering the export sector are greater under
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 In the linear case i t is straightforward to show that an increase in K commits the MNE to a higher output
and reduces its rivals’ output. The effect on q operates directly, via product market competition, and
indirectly via the wage setting process. The first effect is negative and will dominate the second which is
positive.
12
 As in the no market interaction case, dwc/dK will be negative  for sufficiently large N and small α..
13
 Of course, if the MNE was already exporting into the foreign market,  FDI would  not introduce a new
competitor and the welfare losses to the host country would  be lower than here. The exact effect of this on
welfare would depend on the cost competitiveness of the MNE’s operation outside the home country. We
ignore this possibility  here because our concern is with cross comparisons between centralised and
14
decentralised bargaining, but this is reversed when the MNE is very productive (α low), in
which case the much higher centralised wage  has serious negative consequences for the
profitability of domestic firms.
Having considered the welfare values ( jaj WW − ), we turn to the discussion of
welfare levels in order to determine the government’s preferred bargaining regime, in the
presence of FDI. We find that cd WW <  (for sufficiently large α and N). This is because in
this case mc ww >  and  the higher centralised wage would act like an export tax: it yields
rents to domestic residents (the unions) and it reduces output through an increase in the
export price, moving the economy towards the monopoly output level. Despite the fact that
mc
ww > , it is straightforward to show that the MNE prefers to locate in the host country
under centralised rather than under decentralised wage setting (except for α very close to
unity), because in this case the higher centralised wage hurts its host country’s rivals more
than itself. Hence, for sufficiently large α and N a congruence of interest applies between
the MNE and the government, with both preferring the centralised wage setting regime.
4.3.2. Firms sell domestically   When firms are selling on the home market, the pro-
competitive effect of the extra firm benefits consumer surplus14. Nevertheless, the
possibility of welfare gains is normally restricted to the decentralised wage setting case,
with  the “welfare value” of inward FDI being typically negative under wage centralisation,
particularly for low N and low α.  This is because the negative effects of the MNE on home
firms via the centralised wage outweighs any gains to consumers.
Turning now from welfare values to welfare levels, we can show that cd WW > .
With domestic sales, the “tax-like” effect of the higher centralised wage always results in
welfare being higher under decentralised than under centralised wage setting. Thus, in
contrast to the case in which firms export only, a conflict of interest between the MNE and
the host country government would normally arise.
4.3.3. The centralised firm specific wage setting It is worth noting that the
centralised wage setting process considered so far assumes that the centralised union sets a
                                                                                                                                             
decentralised wage settings.
15
single wage for all firms. However,  the existence of labour productivity gaps between
firms, may encourage unions to cooperatively set different wages for different firms. Given
the assumed symmetry of domestic firms, this would imply the setting of a single wage for
the domestic firms and a different wage for the MNE.  With no market interaction, this case
collapses into the decentralised wage setting regime. With market interaction, the
centralised union will exploit the higher productivity of the foreign firm by setting a MNE-
specific wage which exceeds that paid by the host country’s firms. This higher wage implies
that the welfare value of the MNE would typically be positive when firms compete in the
domestic market. This is in sharp contrast to the standard non-discriminatory centralised
wage setting regime discussed above. Inward FDI would still typically be welfare reducing
when firms compete in an export market (at least for sufficiently large α). The losses,
however, would be smaller than in the decentralised and standard centralised regimes.
4.3.4. Comparison of market interaction with no-market interaction  Except (i) in the
“centralised firm specific wage setting” case under market interaction, and (ii) when its
productivity advantage is extremely small, the MNE will prefer a centralised wage setting
regime (with and without market interaction), thus contradicting one of the conventional
wisdoms mentioned in the introduction.
With respect to the welfare value of inward FDI, we find that direct product market
competition makes welfare losses from inward FDI more likely, because the MNE will
capture market shares from the indigenous firms, thus reducing their profits. This will have
a direct adverse effect on welfare, not compensated by the entrant’s profits which are
repatriated. The fall in welfare will often be larger under wage centralisation because of the
additional externality on domestic firms generated by the common industry wide-wage.
The overall policy implication of these results is that there are circumstances in
which the government would prefer to prevent entry, unless it could raise a location tax at
least equal to the negative “welfare value” of FDI.
4.3.5. A note on the employment effects of FDI   One of the reasons why governments
encourage inward FDI is its supposedly positive employment effects to the host country.
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 This pro-competitive benefit would be lower if the MNE already exported to the home market.
16
Although we do not explicitly take account of employment effects in our welfare function
in (5), it still may be interesting to consider the effect of the entry of the foreign MNE on
the host country’s employment15. It is straightforward to show that without market
interaction, inward FDI increases employment regardless of the bargaining regime. Note
however that, due to the negative externality that the MNE’s entry has on home firms
under centralised wage setting, ( dΛ - daΛ )>( cΛ - caΛ ), where jΛ  and jaΛ  (j=d,c) are total
employment with and without the MNE respectively.  With market interaction, the negative
externality on home firms of inward FDI will reduce the gains in terms of employment:
( dΛ - aΛ )<0 for sufficiently small α and large N, and (
cΛ - aΛ )<0 unless α is very close to
unity.
5. Capital Investment and Policy
So far we have assumed an exogenous level of the MNE’s capital investment in the
host country. An important dimension of FDI, however, concerns the level of capital the
MNE decides to commit to its foreign operation. As is clear from the analysis carried out
so far, the amount of capital invested, by determining the cost advantage of the MNE over
domestic firms, affects the unions optimal policy. In this section we endogenise the MNE’s
optimal investment decision and we analyse how it is affected by the different bargaining
regimes. In order to isolate this issue, in the first instance we shall not model the location
decision of the MNE16. This will subsequently be added to the model.  Furthermore, we
shall allow for the host country’s government to be policy active towards the MNE by
optimally choosing a capital subsidy. Our aim is to analyse how the government’s optimal
policy is affected by the nature of the wage setting process.
In order to address the issues outlined above, we now modify the structure of the
game discussed in the previous sections. We shall model the interaction between agents as a
four stage game. In stage one, the government chooses the capital subsidy σ. In stage two,
the multinational chooses to invest a level capital K.  In stage three, the unions set the wage
under either centralised or decentralised bargaining and in stage four firms make their
output decisions. As before, we shall consider two types of product market competition:
                                               
15
 Of course, the welfare function could be easily modified to give a positive weight to employment.
16
 This situation can be thought of as one in which either the MNE has already made its location decision
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market interaction and no-market interaction. Hence, the last two stages of the game
correspond to the last two stages analysed in the previous sections. Since these have
already been discussed, in what follows we shall confine our attention to stage one and
two.
5.1. No product market interaction
In stage two of the game the MNE chooses the level of capital investment in the
host country by maximising the following profit function with respect to K
K)K(Lw)D,y(R ***** σΨπ +−−= (17)
Compared to the profit function in (1), equation (17) contains an additional term reflecting
the  total subsidy received by the MNE (σK). Also, the fixed cost F has been replaced by
the total cost of capital )K(Ψ . The first order condition is:
0
dK
dwL)}()y,K(Lw{
dK
d ***
K
*
*
=−−−−= ψσπ (18)
where ψ≡ d K
dK
Ψ ( )
 is the marginal cost of capital. The term in chain brackets represents the
non-strategic effect of capital investment. If wages were exogenous, this term would be set
equal to zero and the firm would choose the cost minimising level of K. Instead, the MNE
must now take account of the strategic effect of its investment on the union wage, given by
the last term of the right-hand-side of equation (18). The sign of this term will differ
depending on the nature of the wage setting process.
When wages are set at the firm level, dw
dK
dw
dK
m*
=  will be positive if  ∂∂ ∂
2
0U
w Km
*
> ,
which we could take to be the “normal” case. In the  linear case, it is easy to see that
dw
dK
m
>0.  In that case, it therefore follows from this that MNE will strategically underinvest
in K to keep the wages down. As far as we know this is the first time that this strategic
incentive to under-engage in FDI has been isolated: it is not just high wages that deter FDI,
                                                                                                                                             
or where its profit constraint is not binding.
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but if wages rise in K this too can deter a high investment level.
With wage centralisation,  dw
dK
dw
dK
c*
=  will be positive if  0
Kw
V
c
2
>∂∂
∂
. However,
as was previously discussed, even in the linear case this condition may not hold: a higher K
will increase the potential for rent extraction, but the resulting higher wage will damage
employment opportunities not only in the MNE but also in the less efficient domestic
sector. Therefore circumstances may arise where unions choose to reduce the wage to
increase employment. Hence, under centralised bargaining, even in the linear case, the
MNE may over or underinvest in capital, depending on the effect of its investment on the
wage.
In the first stage of the game, the government chooses the capital subsidy to
maximise domestic welfare. The total welfare function now includes the total subsidy bill
and is given by:
K)U(UCSW
n
i
i
i
* σπ −+++= ∑ (19)
With decentralised unions, we obtain the following optimal subsidy:
K
)K,w(L)ww(
ddK
K m*md
NI ∂
∂
σ
σ −+−=   (20)
where the subscript “NI” and the superscript “d” indicate “no market interaction” and
“decentralised wage setting” respectively. The two terms on the right-hand-side of (20)
represent the two rent extraction motives for the government subsidy/tax policy. The first is
a direct effect through taxing the multinational firm’s capital and is negative. The second is
indirect and stems from the unionisation of the labour market (this term clearly equals
K)w,K(U m* ∂∂ ). This term occurs because the government wishes to raise employment
in the multinational sector when there are rents to be extracted there. If this is negative, so
that an increase in K reduces employment, this effect works towards a tax. It is
straightforward to show that in the linear case this must hold.
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In the centralised case, the optimal subsidy will be given by:
dK
dw1
dw
dq)q(p
N
MNq
K
)K,w(L)ww(
ddK
K c
c
c*
cc
NI 



+′−−+−= ∂
∂
σ
σ (21)
Clearly the first two terms on the right-hand-side of (21) have the same interpretation as in
equation (20) above, though the second of these terms may not have the same sign. The
last term captures two additional interrelated effects that arise in the centralised bargaining
case. The first is an effect on consumer surplus which arises when M≤N of the domestic
firms sell at home. The second  gives the home producer surplus net of union rent17 and
captures the link between the MNE and the domestic firms generated by the centralised
wage. If dw
dK
c
>0 this final term is negative and works against a subsidy. This is because the
subsidy, by increasing K and thus cw , reduces total surplus (consumer surplus, plus home
producers surplus, plus union rents) in the domestic sector.
Equations (20) and (21) suggest that dNIσ  is presumptively greater than cNIσ . With
centralised wage setting, the negative spill-over effect on domestic firms’ profitability of a
higher subsidy-induced capital investment would be taken into account by the government.
5.2. Product market interaction
When competing directly with the host country’s firms on the product market, the
MNE’s optimal choice of capital investment in stage two of the game will be determined by
the following first order condition:
0
dK
dDR
dK
dwL)}(Lw{
dK
d *
D
*
**
y
*
*
* =+−−−−= ψσπ (22)
Compared to (18), (22) contains an additional term 



=
dK
dQR
dK
dDR *Q
*
*
D*
 which captures
the effects on rivals’ output of an increase in capital investment through both the product
                                               
17
 In the normal case the subsidy raises wc . This worsens the labour market distortion and therefore reduces
domestic welfare.
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and the labour markets and therefore represents the strategic effect of K on domestic firms’
output. If this term is positive18, the multinational over-invests in capital in order to gain a
strategic advantage over the domestic firm.
 With decentralised wages, dw
dK
dw
dK
m*
= .  When this is positive, as was shown to
happen in the linear case, the multinational will under-invest in capital in order to keep the
union wage down. When the  wage is centralised,  dw
dK
dw
dK
c*
=  which may not be positive
even in the linear case. Thus, with centralised wage bargaining the MNE may under or over
invest.
The optimal subsidy with decentralised wage setting is given by
dK
)CS(dR
dK
dy
dK
dq)1N(N
dK
dq)ww(N
dK
dw
w
)K,w,w(L
K
)K,w,w(L)ww(
d/dK
K
D
m*m*
md
I
+


+−+−+


 +−+−= ∂
∂
∂
∂
σ
σ
(23)
where the superscript “I” indicates “product-market-interaction”. As in the no-market-
interaction case, the first term of (23) captures the incentive to tax K and reflects the direct
cost to the government of subsidisation. This term, therefore, works against a subsidy. The
second term, within chain brackets, reflects the impact of a capital increase on the MNE’s
level of employment. It consists of a direct effect at constant wages (present even without
market interaction) and an indirect effect which works through the rivals’ wages; the
former may be positive or negative, depending on which of the productivity or output
effects of a capital increase dominates; the indirect effect will typically be negative, thus
working towards a tax. The third term captures the effects of a policy induced change in K
on the domestic sector’s employment and union rents. This can be written as:



−
∂
∂
−+∂
∂
−=−
dK
dwQ
dK
dw
w
Q)ww(
K
Q)ww(
dK
dQ)ww(
m
m
 where the first two terms on
the right hand side represent the direct and indirect effects (working through mw ). The last
                                               
18
 This term is likely to be positive with strategic substitutes.
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term represents the impact of K on w and thus on home producer surplus net of union rents.
This overall effect is also likely to be negative. The fourth term in (23) is new and captures
changes in domestic firms’ profitability resulting from changes in K. This term is likely to be
negative and therefore works towards a tax. If the multinational sells its product on the
domestic market, the last term of equation (23) will exist and reflect the effect of the capital
subsidy on consumers’ surplus. This term is typically positive. 
The optimal subsidy under wage centralisation will be given by:
dK
)CS(dR
dK
dy
dK
dq)1N(N
dK
dq)ww(N
K
)K,w(L)ww(
d/dK
K
D
c*
cc
I
+


+−+−+
−+−= ∂
∂
σ
σ
(24)
The first two terms of (24) have the same interpretation as the first two terms on the right-
hand-side of (23). The third can now be written as:



−∂
∂
−=−
dK
dwQ
K
Q)ww(
dK
dQ)ww(
c
cc
 whose terms have similar interpretation as those
in (23). In particular, the last one captures the effect of changes in the centralised wage of
domestic firms’ producer surplus net of changes in the domestic sector’s union rents. An
increase in cw  leads to a transfer of rents from the domestic firms to the unions. However,
the fall in firms’ rents exceeds the gain in unions’ rents. The final two terms in (24) have the
same interpretation as those in (23).
From equations (23) and (24) we are less likely to get dIσ > 
c
Iσ  than to get
d
NIσ >
c
NIσ  from equations (20) and (21). One of the reasons for this is that we are more
likely to get 0
dK
dwc
<  which implies that a subsidy has positive benefits on both producers’
and consumers’ surplus.
In general, a positive capital subsidy is less likely with market interaction than
without. The principal reason for this is the negative effect of a higher K on the MNE’s
domestic rivals’ profitability.
If the MNE’s location decision is subject to a binding profit constraint ( )*π π> ,
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the government maximises the lagrangian L W= + −λ π π( )* . The resulting subsidies are
$σ σ λkj kj K= + , (j=d,c; k=NI,I). The extra term (λK)>0 will work towards a subsidy.
Clearly, when the constraint is binding, the capital subsidy plays a role analogous to the
location subsidy examined in Section 5. The government will want to encourage the MNE’s
only if its “welfare value” is positive. As we have seen in the previous section,
circumstances may exist in which this welfare value may not be positive.
In this section we have endogenized the MNE’s capital choice  and explored the
optimal policy towards foreign capital investment. The strategic effect  of the MNE’s
investment on the wage is crucial in determining both the MNE’s investment decision and
the government’s optimal policy. In the decentralised wage-setting case, a higher level of K
raises the wage faced by the MNE ( w* ). This is also the normal case under centralised
wage setting without market interaction. However under centralised wage setting and
market interaction this is often reversed.
It follows from the above that when wages are set at the firm level, the MNE will
strategically underinvest in capital in order to keep the wage down. This will be reversed in
those centralised wage setting situations in which the wage is negatively related to the level
of capital invested.
With respect to the optimal policy, the no-market interaction subsidy under wage
centralisation contains a term that is not present when wages are set at the firm level. This
extra term, due to the negative distortionary effects of a higher centralised wage, works
towards a tax when the wage increases in capital. Things are less clear in the market
interaction case as the centralised wage may fall in the level of K.  In general however,
these results confirm that the host country’s government may not find it optimal to
encourage a higher level of FDI via capital subsidisation.
Thus, in the paper we have looked at the two dimension of FDI: location and the
amount of capital committed. We have found that in both cases the government will often
wish to discourage FDI, in particular in the presence of negative externalities generated by
the MNE towards domestic firms through either the goods or the unionised labour market.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on the nature of product market interaction between a MNE and
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a host country’s firms in examining the effects of different degrees of wage setting
centralisation on  (1) the incentive of a MNE to locate in the host country, (2) the optimal
level of investment it decides to commit to its foreign operation, and (3) the host country’s
welfare.
Our results suggest that there may be circumstances in which it will not be desirable
for a government to encourage inward FDI. We find that negative welfare effects of FDI
occur when there is direct product market competition between the MNE and the host
country’s firms. In this case the foreign MNE will effectively capture market shares from
indigenous firms thus reducing their profits. This effect is shown to be particularly strong in
the presence of centralised wage setting processes. Hence, we highlight a channel through
which inward FDI can have adverse effects on the host country’s welfare. Clearly, in real
world situations the net change in welfare would depend on many other factors (e.g.
technical spill-overs from foreign firms). However, we believe that our findings, which cast
at least some doubts on the general validity of the commonly held view that FDI is always
welfare improving, are intuitive and are consistent with some of the empirical evidence on
FDI (see Caves, 1996, for a discussion of the effects of FDI on market structure and
indigenous firms profitability). Therefore, our analysis points to the need for empirical
research to disentangle the relative importance of this and of the other factors which
determine the welfare effects of FDI on the receiving country.
When the capital  investment of the MNE is endogenous, the wage setting regime
affects the amount of capital invested and the potential for rent extraction. We show that
the MNE will tend to underinvest relative to the cost-minimising level in order to limit the
rent extraction of the union, if the negotiated wage is positively related to capital
investment.
We also show that, contrary to what frequently argued, in the absence of
taxes/subsidies, the MNE will be less likely to locate in the host country under a
decentralised than under a centralised wage setting regime, despite the fact that the latter
will typically yield higher wages.
Many natural extensions suggest themselves, such as technological spill-overs from
MNEs to domestic firms, experimenting with different degrees of bargaining power of the
unions, and examining cases in which the MNE can negotiate special union arrangements
24
with the host country’s government. These topics are left for future research.
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